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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE MORRIS, 
A~ppellant, 
vs. 
THE FARNSWORTH MOTEL, 
AND DEWEY F. FARNSWORTH, 
FRANK M. FARNSWORTH, and J. 
L. CARDON, d.b.a. THE F ARNS-
WORTH MOTEL, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 7947 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Appellant was injured when he struck his foot 
against a chair so plaeed by motel employees as to 
partially obstruct the passageway between the sleeping 
room and the bathroom of the motel unit occupied by 
plaintiff. The chair was placed in this position in the 
late afternoon, after the plaintiff had engaged the motel 
unit and had entered it and become familiar with its 
arrangement, and had left for the evening. 
This case comes before the court as an appeal from 
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an Order and Judgment of the district court granting 
the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since there "ras no trial of the case on its merits~ 
the only factual basis upon which this case rests is 
to be found in the pleadings and in the affidavits of 
the defendants on file herein, and as in the case of a 
directed verdict, must be construed most favorably to 
the appellant. 
The defendants, as revealed by the complaint and 
by their affidavits, are co-partners operating a motel 
in El Paso, Texas. 
The plaintif~ arrived in El P·aso on May 30, 1952, 
late in the afternoon, somewhere he tween 4 :40 and 6 :00 
o'clock, and rented one of the motel units. H·e took 
possession of the unit to the extent of inspecting it 
and familiarizing himself with it. Thereafter, in hi~ 
absence from the motel, the furniture of the motel unit 
was rearranged by motel employees. In doing so, a 
chair was placed in a position where the front of it 
partially ob~tructed the passageway from the sleeping 
room to the bathroom and in such a position as to be 
in the shadow of other furniture in the room. Plaintiff's 
wife returned to the motel and retired early, but plain-
tiff did not return to the motel until about 10 :30 or 
11 :00, after his wife had retired and "\\ras asleep. The 
room was partially illuminated by lights fro1n outside 
the motel ·and plaintiff disrobed in the semi-illutninnted 
room rather than turn on the lights and awaken his 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'vife, and he then made his way toward the bathroom, 
at which time, he struck his foot against the chair which 
had been left so as to partially obstruct the passageway. 
As -a result of striking the chair plaintiff broke the small 
toe.on his left foot. (R.1, 2). 
Plaintiff's allegation in his complaint, is: 
"That on May 30, 1952, the plaintiff rented 
one of the apartments in the said motel from the 
said partnership; that after plaintiff had rented 
said apartment and had entered into the s·ame 
and become acquainted with the plan of the said 
apartment and the location of the furniture 
therein, and during plaintiff's absence from the 
apartment, one of the said partners or an em-
ployee of the said partnership, entered the apart-
ment in the course of preparing the same for 
occupancy, and wilfully or recklessly or negli-
gently placed and left a chair in the passagew·ay 
leading to the bathroom doorway; that there-
after about 10 :30 p.m. of said day, and after the 
said partner or employee had left the apart-
ment, -and after plaintiff's wife had retired, and 
while the apartment was generally illuminated 
through its windows by the light of the motel, 
and while the said passageway was in the shadow, 
the plaintiff attempted to go into said bathroom, 
and, while doing so, and without seeing the chair 
because of said shadow, ran into the said chair, 
breaking and dislocating the little toe on his 
left foot; ... " 
Dewey Farnsworth, one of the· partners 'acknowl-
edged in his affidavit that it was he who re-arranged 
the furniture in the cabin and that the chair was placed 
by him in a position partially blocking the door to the · 
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bathroom, som~time late in the afternoon. That he and 
plaintiff sat in the motel office apartment until about 
midnight before plaintiff went ·to his cabin. (R. 7, 8). 
His affidavit also reveals that there is a neon light 'Yhich 
runs around most of the motel. 
The affidavit of J. L. Cardon reveals that there 
is sufficient light from the outside to see around in the 
rooms of the motel. (R. 9, 10). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE EN-
TITLED TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS A JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS DIS-
MISSING PLAINTIFF'S CO·MPLAINT. 
ARGUMENT 
a. DEFENDANTS, AS MOTEL KEEPERS, HAD A 
DUTY OF SEARCHING OUT HIDDEN DEFECTS AND 
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO RELY ON THIS DUTY 
AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY BY THE DE-
FENDANTS~ 
Motel keepers, on an equal footing with hotel 
keepers and others providing similar fa·cilities, o\\Te a 
duty of due care to their guests. Reasonable eare, conl-
mensurate with the nature of the business in which they 
are engaged, dictates that paying guests· are entitl\:'d 
to be free from haz·ards placed and created by the motel 
keepers. The plaintiff, in renting the motel unit a~­
signed to him by the defendants was, of course, a bus-
iness visitor, and as such, was entitled to all of the care 
and caution required of the possessor of land with 
relation to business visitors. Because the possessor of 
land is required to take reasonable care to ·ascertain 
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the actual condition of the premises and make thPm 
reasonably safe or give 'Yarning of dangerous condi-
tions, and because the business visitor is entitled to 
expect such care and caution: 
''Therefore, a business visitor is not required 
to be on the alert to discover defects which if 
he were a bare licensee, entitled to expect noth-
ing but notice of known defects, he might bE' 
negligent in not discovering.'' (Restatement of 
the Law of Torts, Sec. 343, Comment (d).) 
This principle is enunciated in Shattuck v. St. 
Francis Hotel, 7 Cal. 2d 358, 60 P. 2d 855, wherein it is 
said: 
"The fact that the plaintiff visited the room 
·and inspected the furnishings does not, in our 
judgment, change the rule of responsibility. She 
had the right to assume that the landlord knew, 
and had means of knowing, that everything re-
quired- for the ordinary use and occupancy was 
free from any fault consistent with the proper 
use and enjoyment of the room.'' 
Thus, the defendants in this case were duty bound 
to discover dangerous conditions existing in the rooms 
of their motel and either rectify the same or warn the 
occupants adequately in order to protect them from 
harm. In Carpenter vs. Syret, 99 ·utah 208, 104 P. 2d 
617, the court stated the rule to be : 
22. 
''It is the duty of a hotel keeper to main-
tain his buil_ding and premises in a condition 
reasonably safe for its guests.'' 
To the same effect is 43 C.J.S. 1076, Inkeepers, Sec. 
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The same principle has been applied under many 
factual situations involving f·acilities and fixtures of 
hotels, among which are the following: In Adan1s rs. 
Do·w Hotel Co., 25 Cal. App. 2d 51, 76 P. 2d 210, "·here 
a porcelain faucet in· the bathroom broke causing in-
juries; in Topley vs. Zeeman, 216, Cal. 182, 13 P. 2d 
'666, where a bathtub, supported by three legs and son1e 
blocks of wood in place of a fourth, gave way injuring 
plaintiff; and in Robertson vs. Weigert, 136 Old. 145, 
276 P. 741, where a c.atch on the hand railing failed to 
work properly and plaintiff fell through the railing. 
b. THE DEFENDANTS IN THE EXERCISE OF 
REASONABLE CARE SHOULD HAVE FORSEEN THE 
LIKELIHOOD OF INJURY TO· A PATRON BY A CHAIR 
PLACED SO AS TO PARTIALLY BLOCK AND OBSTRUCT 
THE PASSAGEWAY BETWEEN THE TWO ROOMS. 
The question which comes sharply into focus, is 
whether or not the defendants in the exercise of due 
care under the circumstances should have considered the 
likelihood of injury to their paying guests arising from 
an obstruction so placed as to constitute a partial barrier 
to free access of the passageway bet,veen sleeping roo1n 
and bathroom. Common sense dictates that they must 
regard an obstruction so placed as to be partially in 
the shadows to be a potential source of danger to their 
patrons. The bathroom was an adjunct of the sleeping 
room and was so intended and in fact a portion of thr 
revenue which motels produce undoubtedly has its 
foundation in the fact that the motel rooms are equipped 
with such facilities. 
The defendants, therefore, kno,ving that the bath-
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room facilities would be used with the sleeping room 
and intending that the facilities be so used, took it upon 
then1selves to re-arrange the furniture in the room 
\Yhile the plaintiff \Yas away from the room and after 
he had familiarized hin1self with it, and placed the 
offending chair in such a position that the front of it, 
\vhile in the shado,vs, partially blocked the passageway 
to the ba throon1. 
True, so commonplace a thing as a chair would not 
ordinarily seem to be an object vvhich would be con-
sidered dangerous. Yet, however, placed so as. to ob-
struct a passageway which defendants knew would be 
used at all hours of the day and night, it became fully 
as dangerous as if there had been a loose board or 
other similar object to impede safe pass~ge between 
the two rooms. 
The defendants in the exercise of ordinary care 
toward a business visitor should have realized that 
changing the location of a ·chair late in the afternoon 
so that it obstructed the bathroom passageway would 
be potentially dangerous to persons seeking to pass by 
it during the night time hours. It must have been ob-
vious to the defendants that their patrons would not 
normally turn on all of the lights in the motel at a late 
hour 'vhen retiring separately or in :mpving about the 
motel during the night if occasion arose, and that con-
sequently the chair so placed was a hazard and de-
fendants were negligent in leaving it in that location. 
In the case of Baker vs. Decker, (Utah) 212 P. 2d 
679, a tenant of an apartment house was injured when 
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she tripped over a bunched up portion of a drop cloth 
which, along \vith a work table, projected out into the 
passageway through which the plaintiff \valked. Plain-
tiff as she approached the canvas noticed it, and stepped 
on it with her left foot. In attempting to progress \Yith 
her right foot, she either misjudged the height of the 
canvas or caught her right foot in the fold or ruffle, 
tripped and fell to the floor. The court held that there 
w~s thus created a question of fact for the jury as to 
whether ·nefendant was guilty of negligence in not bar-
ricading the place where the equipment was located. 
In the case Ft. Dodge Hotel Co. v-s. Bartlet, 119 F. 
2d 253, the plaintiff and her husband went to a hotel 
which they previously visited, and were shown a roo1n. 
After inspecting the room they, under the guidance of 
the bell boy started down the hall to inspect a second 
room. The bell boy left the luggage in the hall near 
the wall, and as plaintiff turned to follow the bell boy 
and her husband down the hall she tripped over the 
luggage. The court on appeal said: 
''Taking into consideration all of the f.acts 
and circumstances in the aspect most favorable 
to the plaintiff, the jury might reasonably haYe 
believed that an innkeeper, in the exercise of 
due care, would not have left the baggage of n 
large woman "\\Tearing glasses, and ·carrying a 
purse and a hat box, in a not too well lighted 
hallway, where it would be underfoot if she fol-
lowed the shortest path between the room she 
had just looked at and another room which she 
had been invited to inspect.'' 
A case closely allied to the factual picture of the 
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present case is that of Lombardi vs. Woolworth ·Com-
pany, 303 Mass. 417, 22 N.E. 2d 28. In this case a 
radiator projected into the aisle of a store some eight 
inches. Just beyond it was a scale the platform of 
which extended sixteen inches beyond the radiator. The 
aisle 'vas eight feet nine inches wide. Plaintiff struck 
her foot against the platform of t~e weighing scale 
and fell. The court held that the question of negligence 
under such circun1stances was one for the jury. 
In the case at bar, the innkeeper similarly h·ad a 
duty to provide safe premises for his paying guests. 
It is evident that a chair left in a passageway is an 
obstruction 'vhich creates a hazard. Even if the room 
was well lighted, so that ability to see was not a factor, 
the position of the chair, projecting out into the pass-
ageway so as to appreciably narrow it, would be con-
sidered by people as a hazard to be eliminated. This 
would be so, even though the chair or other obstacle 
was placed in an open space, if the position of the ob-
stacle was such as to interfere with the normal traffic 
pattern of people passing through the room. 
In the case at bar, the owner had the room con-
structed with a doorway of normal width, so as to allow 
free passage back and forth between the bedroom and 
bathroom. This was not because it wouldn't have been 
possible to have gotten along with a passageway half 
the width, for doubtless people could squeeze through 
without too much difficulty, but the full width of door-
way \Vas left to allow free and easy passage. If that 
doorway was blocked so as to narrow the passageway 
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by one-half, few people "rould go through the doorway 
without taking time to push the chair back out of the 
passageway. That would be the normal thing to do. 
This is true, not because it wouldn't be possible to 
squeeze through the other half of the doorway space, 
but because people do not normally surround themselves 
with hazards, especially when with slight effort they 
can be eliminated. 
In the instant case, the defendants in the exercise 
of' that degree of care imposed upon them for the pro-
tection of their paying guests must be held to anticipate 
and forsee that they had created a hazard and were 
negligent in so doing. 
Certainly there is. ·ample evidence of negligence on 
the part of defendants to justify this case having been 
submitted to a jury and left to the trier of facts to 
make a factual determination, rather than to be ruled 
upon as a question of law as did the trial court in this 
instance, and accordingly the trial court erred in ruling 
as he· did. 
c. PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE OR LACK THEREOF 
WAS A QUESTION FOR THE TRIER OF THE FACTS AND 
NOT A QUESTION FOR DETERMINATION BY THE COURT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
As indicated under argument a., a business visitor 
is not required to be on the alert to discover defects to 
the same extent as would be a bare licensee. lie is 
entitled to assume that the possessor of the property 
has undertaken reasonable care for his safety commen-
surate with his position. Restatement of Torts, Sec. 
343, Comment (d). 
10 
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The plaintiff in this case, had examined the room 
in the afternoon, and "~as familiar with its arrange-
ment, and was entitled to rely on the condition of the 
premises as he then knew them. . This was not the sit-
uation of a person groping blindly about the room, 
where every object constitutes a hazard, but a situa-
tion "Therein there was adequate illumination from the 
outside to allow the plaintiff to proceed to prepare to 
retire ''ithout the need of disturbing his wife who had 
retired early. The light was sufficient to allow him 
to move about safely in relation to the knowledge he 
had of the room from his examination of it. He had no 
duty to search for dangers himself, and had the right 
to rely on the fact that defendants were required to 
search out such dangers and to notify him of them or 
to correct them. People do not customarily disturb the 
slumbers of others at a late hour by turning on lights 
where sufficient light to allow movement is available 
from another source, and the standard of care of a 
reasonable person would dictate no such added precau-
tion under normal circumstances. Plaintiff had no 
reason to anticipate that defendants would obstruct 
a doorway, and consequently did not have the duty to 
flood the room with light in anticipation of such an 
obstruction. 
In Baker vs. Decker, Utah, 212 P. 2d 679, this court 
on ·appeal concluded that ,it was not negligence in law 
for an elderly woman to proceed across an area of 
hallway covered by a rumple-d drop cloth, and that this 
was a question for the jury. Certainly, in the present 
11 
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case, where plaintiff was less apprized of- the danger 
than in Baker 12s. Decker, the issue of contributory neg-
igence is one which should have been submitted to the 
JUry. 
The summary judgment procedure is a remedy to 
be used with circumspection, and where, as here, a. 
factual picture appears, based upon which the jury 
could reasonably find defendants- ·guilty of negligence 
and plaintiff free from contributory negligence, it "~as 
error on the part of the Court to foreclose the plaintiff 
the opportunity of fully developing the factual picture 
for the triers of the facts. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the fact that a jury could reasonably 
find that defendants were negligent in leaving a chair 
in such a position where it obstructed free movement 
and access between rooms, whi·ch defendants in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have realized con-
stituted a hazard to occupants of the motel, and the 
fact that defendants failed to discover and warn plain-
tiff of this obscured defect and dangerous condition, 
and because the jury could reasonably find the plain-
tiff free from contributory negligence, it is respectfully 
12 
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submitted and urged that the trial court erred in ruling 
as a matter of law that defendants were not negligent 
and in granting defendants a summary judgment, an·d 
that the trial court's ruling should be reversed and the 
case remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
IRWIN CLAWSON 
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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